almost a diary, compulsory reading, US Politics, USA

American Exchange Students In Germany.

Yesterday, my sister published an article about American exchange students’ perception of the Iraq/media induced rift between the the Bush and Schroeder administrations in the local edition of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung [it’s not online, unfortunately].

I’m glad she found some American students to talk to. There are not too many of them. At the Johannes-Gutenberg-University in Mainz, only seventy-nine Americans are enrolled. Seventy-nine out of a student body of approximately 30,000. Seventy-nine out of approximately 4,000 non-German students. But let me be clear here – this is by no means an unusually low number. All those US students here at the moment must have made the decision to go to Germany a fair amount of time before the anyone used the word rift to describe German-American relations.

Sure, talking to people is not quantitative research. But it does give you some idea of what’s going on, if those you talk to do have an opinion. I’m glad my sister found some who had. I met two American undergraduate students in Munich early in Febuary who replied to my question about their opinion of the ongoing quarrel that they were not sufficiently well informed about the issue to have an opinion of their own. That was on the day when another American, Donald Rumsfeld, was in town and was told by Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister, that he had not yet been convinced of the necessity of war in Iraq.

In their defence, I don’t think the two girls were particularly interested in politics in general, so their reply also had a touch of intentional modesty, rather than just one of unfortunate ignorance. Actually, their ignorance shows that there are Americans in this country whose personal reality has only marginally been affected by the international politics, if at all.

It shows that at least those not professionally involved in shaping opinion have learnt to differentiate between those governed and those who govern. The students who were interviewed by my sister basically stated the same – they very much enjoy their stay and have never been bullied by anyone because of their being American, the only notable difference being more political discussions than before.

Those discussions, on the other hand, may not have become too heated, as the Fulbright Commission’s American programme manager Reiner Roh reckons that less than ten percent of the American exchange students who receive Fulbright scholarships support the Bush administration’s policy on Iraq.

Sure, not all American exchange students are Fulbright scholars and there are clearly a lot of possible reasons for such an extreme divergence from the general American attitude, not the least of which is the fact that these students do understand foreign media.

But personally, I believe that there likely is a significant correlation between a person’s willingness to learn about different cultures and her political acceptance of an international order constraining even the most powerful, which is fundamentally at odds with divide-et-impera policies of a Kagan-style (neo-Bismarckian) system of ad-hoc axes and alliances.

So I would like to repeat something rather important these days – there is German-American life beyond governmental quarrels. And it’s a lot more fun. I really wonder what the American students dressed up as for yesterday’s raving Monday parade?

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compulsory reading, US Politics

Some Things, They Never Change…

So someone sent The Observer an email that is rather embarrassing for the Bush administration and even more so for the US agency community. They will probably have to sit down and discuss the meaning of “secret” after this. And for the media effect, it does not even matter if it’s really true. I doubt there will be any official reply to the alligations. So it will take some decades until we will finally know what really happened – if at all.

What happened – according to the Oberserver’s article

“[t]he disclosures were made in a memorandum written by a top official at the National Security Agency – the US body which intercepts communications around the world – and circulated to both senior agents in his organisation and to a friendly foreign intelligence agency asking for its input. The memo describes orders to staff at the agency, whose work is clouded in secrecy, to step up its surveillance operations ‘particularly directed at… UN Security Council Members (minus US and GBR, of course)’ to provide up-to-the-minute intelligence for Bush officials on the voting intentions of UN members regarding the issue of Iraq.”

Seriously folks, what’s the story here? The only interesting thing I can see is that a classified email leaked from the NSA, should that actually be the case. As The Observer backs the story somewhat credibly, someone could lose his job and pension over this. But the eavesdropping bit?

Honestly. How surprising is it that the U.S. administration is actually using its intelligence services to gather intelligence about foreign diplomats living on US soil? You’re right. Not at all – as those observed will know and as The Observer finally admits –

“While many diplomats at the UN assume they are being bugged, the memo reveals for the first time the scope and scale of US communications intercepts targeted against the New York-based missions.”

Fair enough. As for previous scale and scope of US eavesdropping on the UN delegations – below are a few paragraphs about the humble beginnings of both the NSA and the UN from James Bamford’s book “Body of Secrets – Anatomy Of The Ultra-Secret National Security Agency” [taken from pp 21, hardcover edition]. These paragraphs really offer something for everyone, even notorious French-bashers… some things, they really never change. Enjoy.

“On April 25, 1945, as TICOM [Target Intelligence Committee, a predecessor of the NSA ] officers began sloshing through the cold mud of Europe, attempting to reconstruct the past, another group of codebreakers was focused on a glittering party half the earth away, attempting to alter the future.

Long black limousines, like packs of panthers raced up and down the steep San Francisco hills from one event to another. Flower trucks unloaded roses by the bushel. Flashbulbs exploded and champagne flowed like water under the Golden Gate. The event had all the sparkle and excitement of a Broadway show, as well it should have. The man producing it was the noted New York designer Jo Mielziner, responsible for som of the grandest theatrical musicals on the Great White Way. ‘Welcome United Nations’ proclaimed the bright neon marquee of a downtown cinema. The scene was more suited to a Hollywood movie premiere than a solemn diplomatic event. Crowds of sightseers pushed against police lines, hoping for a brief glimpse of someone famous, as delegates from more than fifty countries [yup, a little bit of diversification has occurred since…] crowded into the San Francisco Opera House to negotiate a framework for a new world order.

But the American delegates had a secret weapon. Like cheats at a poker game, they were peeking at their opponents’ hands. Roosevelt fought hard for the United States to host the opening session; it seemed a magnanimous gesture to most of the delegates. But the real reason was to better enable the United States to eavesdrop on its guests.

Coded messages between the foreign delegations and their distant capitals passed through U.S. telegrpah lines in San Francisco. With wartime censoship laws still in effect, Western Union and the other commercial telegraph companies were required to pass on both coded and uncoded telegrams to U.S. Army codebreakers. … By the summer of 1945 the average number of daily messages had grown to 289,802, from only 46,865 in February 1943. The same soldiers who only a few weeks earlier had been deciphering German battle plans were now unraveling the codes and ciphers wound tightly around Argentine negotiating points. …

The decrypts revealed how desperate France had become to maintain its image as a major world power after the war. On April 29, for example, Fouques Duparc, the secretary general of the French delegation, compalined in an encrypted note to General Charles de Gaulle in Paris that France was not chosen to be one of the ‘inviting powers’ to the conference. ‘Our inclusion among the sponsoring powers,’ he wrote, ‘would have signified, in the eyes of all, our return to our traditional place in the world’. …

The San Francisco Conference served as an important demonstration of the usefulness of peacetime signals intelligence. … From the very moment of its birth, the United Nations was a microcosm of East-West spying. Just as with the founding conference, the United States pushed hard to locate the organization on American soil, largely to accomodate the eavesdroppers and codebreakers of NSA and its predecessors.”

And now that I have actually written something about the NSA in my blog… I would like to welcome you guys and your computers. Enjoy my posts.

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Iraq, US Politics

John Brady Kiesling,

is – or rather, has been – an American career diplomat who has written an open letter to Colin Powell to inform him as well as the rest of the world [ via NYTimes, or Sueddeutsche Zeitung , link in German ] of his resignation from the Foreign Service of the United States and from his position as Political Counselor in U.S. Embassy Athens, effective March 7. You might have read his open letter somewhere during the last two days. If not, read it, it is quite interesting.

My initial reaction was “wow, where can I sign this” and “My God, courageous guy. He is surely going to be lynched for alleged treason should he ever return to the US”.

His letter of resignation is a reminder that there is a “Bush, the Cowboy”-perception similar to that in many European Capitals even within the US State Department (which, if I am informed correctly, has always been regarded by “real” hawks as a breeding ground for multilateral weasels anyway…), and that Colin Powell has not been able to successfully “contain” George W. Bush –

“Mr. Secretary, I have enormous respect for your character and ability. You have preserved more international credibility for us than our policy deserves, and salvaged something positive from the excesses of an ideological and self-serving Administration. But your loyalty to the President goes too far. We are straining beyond its limits an international system we built with such toil and treasure, a web of laws, treaties, organizations, and shared values that sets limits on our foes far more effectively than it ever constrained America’s ability to defend its interests.”

But then again, I don’t know John Brady Kiesling. So I take his own words as a useful reminder –

“It is inevitable that during twenty years with the State Department I would become more sophisticated and cynical about the narrow and selfish bureaucratic motives that sometimes shaped our policies. Human nature is what it is, and I was rewarded and promoted for understanding human nature.”

So now, after the appropriate motive scepticism disclaimer, I would like to quote some more parts of his letter.

“… until this Administration it had been possible to believe that by upholding the policies of my president I was also upholding the interests of the American people and the world. I believe it no longer. The policies we are now asked to advance are incompatible not only with American values but also with American interests.”

“… this Administration has chosen to make terrorism a domestic political tool, enlisting a scattered and largely defeated Al Qaeda as its bureaucratic ally. We spread disproportionate terror and confusion in the public mind, arbitrarily linking the unrelated problems of terrorism and Iraq. The result, and perhaps the motive, is to justify a vast misallocation of shrinking public wealth to the military and to weaken the safeguards that protect American citizens from the heavy hand of government. September 11 did not do as much damage to the fabric of American society as we seem determined to so to ourselves. …”

“The loyalty of many of our friends is impressive, a tribute to American moral capital built up over a century. But our closest allies are persuaded less that war is justified than that it would be perilous to allow the U.S. to drift into complete solipsism. Loyalty should be reciprocal. Why does our President condone the swaggering and contemptuous approach to our friends and allies this Administration is fostering, including among its most senior officials. …”

“When our friends are afraid of us rather than for us, it is time to worry. And now they are afraid. Who will tell them convincingly that the United States is as it was, a beacon of liberty, security, and justice for the planet? …”

“I am resigning because I have tried and failed to reconcile my conscience with my ability to represent the current U.S. Administration. “

In related news, I find it quite interesting that it appears as if the letter is only reaching those parts of the public which already agree with the points made, if the blogdex-trackback should actually be a useful indicator of public perception. It seems, pro war blogs are not too active linking Mr Kiesling’s criticism of the current administration’s policy. So, again, everybody is talking to his home market and no real interaction and discussion occurs. Too bad. I think, Mr. Kiesling’s remarks deserve to be taken seriously.

Does anybody know if he got some big media attention in the US – apart from the NYTimes printing the letter?

Is he still alive?

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Political Theory, US Politics

Famous Words.

Not that I think the current international crisis is even slightly reminiscent of the danger posed by the Cuba Missile Crisis in 1962, the words JFK used in his speech to the American people are worth remembering in these days.

“Our goal is not the victory of might, but the vindication of right-not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace and freedom, here in this hemisphere, and, we hope, around the world. God willing, that goal will be achieved. Thank you and good night.”

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German Politics, Iraq, US Politics

A New World Symphony

When I woke up today, SWR3 radio was broadcasting a piece about the non-event that Angela Merkel’s visit is for the US media despite the “royal treatment” – she has been given by the US government, according to the NYTimes – thanks to Amiland for pointing to the article.

There’s much truth in what is said about her visit in the article, in my opinion rather accurately summarised by the following quote from Senator Chuck Hagel, a Nebraska Republican –

“Obviously, she’s the leader of the opposition party, but I do think the real objective here is to put back together and repair the damage that’s been done between these two countries, … Don’t allow America to define Germany by what the chancellor said, or don’t allow Germany to define America by using anti-American sentiments for political purposes.”

But what the article does not even allude to is how the price for her “royal treatment” is perceived over here. SWR3 was unusually harsh in its wording. The price for meeting with all those “you’re either for or against us”-officials is to renounce to a public opinion of one’s own – “a kowtow”.

Well, let’s just say that this is one possible interpretation. And should the NY Times article be read by some more journalists over here than usual, she might well get the some more press coverage after her return, for Angie apparently said that Rumsfeld was right to describe Germany and France as ‘old Europe” –

“… the Defense Department official who described her meeting with Mr. Rumsfeld said she had told him that, whatever his motivation, he had hit an accurate chord in his comments about Germany and France as “old Europe.” The official added that she had also commented that there “was a lot of truth in what he had said and that the discussion had served some good.”

– while she felt –

“… she has a little bit of new Europe in her…”

Lovely. I can already see the vultures. Last Friday, a friend described Merkel’s current political behavior with the following remark – “… she’s just not up to the job.”

Looks like she wants to prove him right.

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German Politics, Iraq, oddly enough, US Politics

Axis And Alliance… We’re Soooooooo Willing.

Politicians are such a crazy bunch sometimes. If you read Ari Fleischer’s [White House spokesman] statements regarding Germany at the White House Press Briefing [search for Germany] last Friday you could indeed think that Germany is now part of the “Alliance of the Willing”. I guess he just wants to confuse the German media ;-) – remember, two weeks ago we were on par with Lybia and Cuba, remember the Axis of Weasel?

MR. FLEISCHER: No, I don’t think that’s the case at all. In fact, take a look — Germany is an example. Germany, we already anticipate, will vote no on any resolution at the Security Council. Yet in the end, Germany played a constructive role in NATO to make certain that our ally, Turkey, could be defended. If you recall, Germany supported the position of the military divisions within NATO, the Defense Planning Committee, to protect Turkey, which indeed is receiving the AWAX and the chemical weapon defenses and other supplies that NATO is now on the ground providing to Turkey. That’s an example of a nation that intends to vote no at the Security Council is still a member of the Alliance and is still helpful in certain regards.

I really wonder what made them change the tune… could it be that Blair’s problems within his parliamentary party are the key? I suppose it’s been a long time since British backbenchers had such a power over war and peace. Maybe W started to count the members of the “Alliance of the Willing” and realised that there aren’t too many that a larger part of the American public would be able to locate on a map should Blair indeed be forced to weasel out, in case the French veto a second resolution.

So the enrollment criteria for the Alliance seem to have become a little more inclusive… Hmm, I wonder what the Schroodle thinks about this development.

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German Politics, Iraq, US Politics

The Rationale Behind Open Opposition

Joshua Micah Marshall offers one more reason behind the unusual open and vocal Old European resistance to the Bush administration’s policy on Iraq.

“… The fact that Brent Scowcroft, the president’s father’s foreign policy guru, keeps on having to resort to the opinion pages to warn the president away from some new foreign policy disaster? (These public missives, of course, are widely and I think correctly seen as veiled messages from former President Bush.)”

Now if even Bush senior is going through the media to talk to his son, I think the conclusion becomes unavoidable that talking to W does not really help to influence his policy decisions. So which option remains for those sceptical of his course? They have to take their opinion out to the street… and there we are.

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Iraq, media, US Politics, USA

Unfortunately, We Can’t Tell You…

what the Matrix is. You have to find out for youself. Today, Paul Krugman is handing out green pills by looking at tv screens on both sides of the rift.

I’m not mainly talking about the print media. […] Most people, though, get their news from TV – and there the difference is immense. The coverage of Saturday’s antiwar rallies was a reminder of the extent to which U.S. cable news, in particular, seems to be reporting about a different planet than the one covered by foreign media.

… On Saturday, news anchors on Fox described the demonstrators in New York as “the usual protesters” or “serial protesters.” …

So it’s not surprising that the target audience is a bit blurry about the distinction between the Iraqi regime and Al Qaeda. Surveys show that a majority of Americans think that some or all of the Sept. 11 hijackers were Iraqi, while many believe that Saddam Hussein was involved in Sept. 11, a claim even the Bush administration has never made. And since many Americans think that the need for a war against Saddam is obvious, they think that Europeans who won’t go along are cowards.

Europeans, who don’t see the same things on TV, are far more inclined to wonder why Iraq – rather than North Korea, or for that matter Al Qaeda – has become the focus of U.S. policy. That’s why so many of them question American motives, suspecting that it’s all about oil or that the administration is simply picking on a convenient enemy it knows it can defeat. They don’t see opposition to an Iraq war as cowardice; they see it as courage, a matter of standing up to the bullying Bush administration.

There are two possible explanations for the great trans-Atlantic media divide. One is that European media have a pervasive anti-American bias that leads them to distort the news, even in countries like the U.K. where the leaders of both major parties are pro-Bush and support an attack on Iraq. The other is that some U.S. media outlets – operating in an environment in which anyone who questions the administration’s foreign policy is accused of being unpatriotic – have taken it as their assignment to sell the war, not to present a mix of information that might call the justification for war into question.

So which is it? I’ve reported, you decide.

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German Politics, Iraq, US Politics

News From Brussels.

So the EU Council has issued a new joint foreign policy declaration on the Iraq question. The core element reads as follows:

“We want to achieve this peacefully. It is clear that this is what the people of Europe want. War is not inevitable. Force should be used only as a last resort. It is for the Iraqi regime to end this crisis by complying with the demands of the Security Council. We reiterate our full support for the ongoing work of U.N. inspectors. They must be given the time and resources that the U.N. Security Council believes they need. However, inspections cannot continue indefinitely in the absence of full Iraqi cooperation.”

Amiland, as well as many others, including Spiegel online[link in German], think Schroeder is the loser of the day.

I don’t. I think he is the big winner.

Following last Friday’s UN Security Council meeting he has been able to rather quietly modify his irresponsible and entirely inflexible adamant “no-to-everything-whatever-new-information-may-become-available” by hiding behind a common EU position. Moreover, he can argue that it was more important to save the idea of a common European foreign policy than to – explicitly – stick to his former position.

I think it was a wise move. Sure, there will be people to claim he just “weaseled out”. But I guess he had realised that weaseling to some extent had become inevitable in order to regain some kind of diplomatic flexibility. So the most important problems were the reasons to explain such a move as well as its perceived salience in the “march to war”. Saving the idea of a common European foreign policy was most certainly the right reason – a motive that even the most ardent anti-warriors will likely swallow. And now that so many people have indeed again started to hope for a peaceful solution to the problem – think of the worlds stock markets as an indicator -, after the anti-war demonstrations last weekend and given the hawks sudden, and probably rather unexpected, difficulties in the UN Security Council, the perceived salience of his concession is likely much lower than it would have been should Germany have been forced to modify Schroeder’s aggressive “no” in the light of any new information convincing other doveish Security Council members of the necessity to make use of the means of last resort.

So this EU foreign policy declaration allowed Schroeder a relatively cheap way to unbind himself. And he used it. This semi-disguised semi-acceptance of the theoretical possibilty of war on Iraq as well as of Germany supporting a possible second UN resolution legitimising it could have indeed saved himself the chancellorship, should such a vote become unavoidable. In my interpretation, this makes Schroeder the big winner of this EU summit.

So what’s the current situation? Chirac seemingly holds the keys to the Security Council’s support now – assuming that Russia and China won’t veto a second resolution should France favour one and thus probably to war. I doubt Blair would send troops without a second resolution – he has consistently said he needs a second one for the British public. He may have proven some of his critics wrong about his poll-led governmental style. He may well support war against the British polls. But he’s not suicidal, in my opinion. He would most certainly not order the Britsh military to attack Iraq without a straightforward resolution supporting military action.

So now the big question is – would the US actually go to war without even the British? Militarily, why not. Politically, the “Coalition Of The Willing” looks even less impressive without the British.

Too hard to tell.

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Iraq, US Politics

Stand still so I can shoot you.

International signaling is a very complicated language sometimes. I have wondered for a long time about a European good-cop, bad-cop strategy behind the different approaches to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. And reading the following excerpt (pp 7-8) from a policy proposal by the conservative/libertarian US think tank CATO Institute you might well come to the conclusion that the European “NO” is not weakening the world’s threat concerning Hussein’s use of WMDs but actually strengthening it – while at the same time allowing both parties involved to speak loudly in their home markets’ preferred rhetoric. With a US government clearly signaling that the issue is much less disarmament than getting rid of Saddam, it might well be the more balanced European position to regime change – in conjunction with the American military build-up – that could prompt the Iraqi dictator into cooperation with the UN. In this interpretation, even the extreme German position does make at least some sense.

“On the other hand, the signals that the current administration has been sending may have dire ramifications. By holding meetings with the Iraqi opposition groups, by leaking plans for conducting an invasion, and by the strident rhetoric in which his administration has engaged, President Bush has strongly communicated his intent to get rid of Hussein. A recent issue of The Economist quoted John Bolton, under secretary of state for arms control and international security affairs, as saying, ‘Our policy at the same insists on regime change in Baghdad and that policy will not be altered whether inspectors go in or not.’ So the message to Hussein is, no matter what you do, the U.S. government is coming to eliminate you. That only gives Hussein more incentive to plan a counterattack – in the event of a U.S. invasion – using WMD against U.S. forces, Israel, or Saudi oil fields, or perhaps even smuggling such a weapon onto U.S. soil. In the face of a threat to his own survival, Hussein will have little incentive to do anything but lash out.

Imagine that a burglar breaks into a house and, while he is rooting through a closet, the owner of the house pulls a gun on him. He is startled and caught off guard. The owner might say, ‘Don’t move or I’ll shoot.’ That is a deterrence message, and it is likely the criminal will heed it because he can avoid an extremely undesirable outcome by doing something that is much less objectionable. He is likely to disobey only if he questions the credibility of the owner’s commitment, believes the owner will shoot him regardless of his obedience, or is suicidal. Alternatively, the owner might say, ‘Put your hands on your head or I’ll shoot.’ That is a message of coercion, and it will also probably be followed, unless the same set of conditions as before applies. Instead, what if the owner said, ‘Stand still so I can shoot you’ – the burglar is likely to fight, or try to get away, because he has nothing to lose by doing so. At least if he takes action, he might have slim odds of survival; if he stands still he has no odds of survival whatsoever. That is the position in which Hussein is being put by the Bush administration. There is no ‘less painful’ option that he can follow to avoid the thing he dreads most – the loss of control of his political regime and maybe his life. Under those circumstances, Hussein is very dangerous.”

However, such an interpretation does not help to clarify the deeper issues – regarding different visions of common security as well as the international system – that have emerged more clearly than ever on both sides of the pond in recent months.

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