compulsory reading

Welcome to Berlusconia!

When I recently read a study examining the extent to which Turkey is currently in compliance with the Kopenhagen criteria, allegedly necessary for membership in the EU, the conclusion was that the country is not a liberal democracy yet, but it has made significant progress. Some people there, however, seem to think that the rule of law is not actually as important as European politicians seem to emphasize, given recent developments in the European core. And while not naming any country, it is rather obvious what they have in mind.

Tonight I watched yet another shocking documentary on arte.tv. They devote this entire evening to discuss what Italy’s prime minister Silvio Berlusconi’s political intentions are beyond deforming the country’s legal system so he can’t actually be jailed for doing what he did to become what he became. The name of the documentary is rightly ambigous: “Berlusconi’s Italy”. Suddenly it seems that many would prefer his government to be only about subordinating the public interest to (often his own) personal/corporate interests.

According to the documentary, songs praising the military successes of fascist black-shirts and the Duce are again being performed live on Berlusconi-controlled television channels – and it was no documentary. I did not recognise the channel logo, so don’t know if it happened on public or private tv. But that distinction seems to lose relevance in the Italian case anyway, as Mr Berlusconi owns most private tv stations and politically controls the public ones now, too). A live performance of something like the “Horst Wessel Lied” (a fascist hymn) on national German tv would clearly cause a national crisis up here. But in Berlusconia, there seem to be less and less screens available to those critical of the Prime Minister and his government.

Let’s hope that Berlusconi’s second reign will turn out to be only one of those many unhappy episodes of post WW2 Italian political life. Let’s hope he won’t be able to damage the country for good. Let’s hope I won’t have to ask my Italian friends one day if they are ok with me starting to actually propagate the use of “Bella Berlusconia”…

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compulsory reading

Turkey’s EU membership? Put it off. Put it on.

The political debate on Turkey’s membership is likely going to be put off again. Given the Franco-German agreement, next weeks EU summit will probably announce a revision of Turkey’s reform effort in 2004. Should the result be positive, membership negotiations could begin in 2005.

I am plainly impressed by the result of the recent diplomatic success. It’s hardly imaginable without silent – but effective – US background management. The US effort has obviously become a lot easier following the transatlantic repercussions produced by Schröder’s “No war in Iraq” campaign. Tying up Turkey with Europe is old US goal and a good reason for the US administration to keep up some pressure on Germany – which usually wasn’t too supportive of the idea of Turkish membership for a lot of reasons. The nee Turkish government’s successes should thus also be seen in the light of the US presenting Schröder with the diplomatic bill.

But it seems there’s more to the Turkish question now than there was ever before. As opposed to the formal political debate which will be adjourned next week it seems a debate about the “Europeaness” of Turkey is beginning all over Europe. This week’s Economist’s editorial is but one indicator. We’ll see if there will be less of that debate once the formal question has been dealt with. My guess is – short term, yes. Medium term, no.

Let’s not be fooled. The question of Turkish membership is probably the most crucial decision the EU has to take since the Single Eurpean Act in 1986. Not simply for geographical reasons. Giscard d’Estaing, president of the European Constitutional Convention, said a month or so ago, that Turkish membership would mean “the end of the European Union”. Well, that might be slightly exaggerated, but I guess what d’Estaing wanted to say was something else anyway and he is certainly right there : Turkish membership will mean the end of the European Union the way we know it.

The question of European finalities will have to be restated in new ways. But that might even be a good thing. I don’t agree with the Economist’s awkward British attitude towards looser integration, but they are clearly pointing out an increasingly true fact about Europe. The more people, the more governments, the more ideas about where European institutional cooperation should headed:

“It is hard to answer that question without deciding what the ultimate purpose of the EU is. But here there is no consensus: the habit of the EU has been to invent itself as it goes along. Its shape and purpose are evolving. It is plainly becoming a hybrid: much more than just a free-trade area but much less than a superstate. For many of its members, not just for those awkward Britons but also for prickly newcomers such as the 40m Poles, a headlong drive towards political and even military integration will be resisted. […] As for Russia, or Morocco, why should geography, or religion, dictate who might join? If the European idea is to inspire, it ought to be about values, not maps or tribes. Countries that can subscribe to the core values of democracy and freedom should be eligible as candidates, be they Slavs or Muslims, and no matter how far they are in miles from Paris or Berlin.”

Very true. But as the last sentence indicates, political cooperation is not only about values. And it is no wonder the Britsh Economist would like to see the looser kind of integration which is the likely outcome of increased European heterogeneity. It follows the (generalised) British idea of Europe and no longer the one of the EU’s (dare I say it? federal!) founders.

“The Economist would prefer this looser sort of Europe, perhaps comprising overlapping inner clubs of those who wish to integrate more tightly.”

I fear history is going to repeat itself. A larger European Union (or however the larger thing will be called) with closer cooperation around the classic core (probably without Italy in the beginning. The first proposal for a core Europe, the now famous “Schäuble-Lamers-paper” from 1994 will become very popular in the near future, I suppose. The renewed Franco-German cooperation is likely as much a result of the perceived widening gap between Europe and the (Republican) US administration as an understanding of this deeper European dynamic.
And the Brits will be out again – until they will realise they are missing something. Churchill’s three spheres of British influence (US, Commonwealth, Europe) may have shifted in salience and to some extent overlap these days. But they still exist – in the form of British ambivalence towards the Continent.

If history is giong to repeat itself, let’s hope it’s gooing to be a farce, not a tragedy. It won’t all be about Turkey. But without Turkey, the European heterogeneity would be a lot easier to handle. We’re approaching interesting times.

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Blair on Europe’s future: A Confederation – including Turkey?

A BlairiteOn November 28 Tony Blair gave a speech in Cardiff outlining his and Britain’s “clear course for Europe”, indicating the British stance on several important issues for the final round of institutional reform debates of the EU framework including the Convention preparing a European constitution in preparation for the actual execution of the Eastern European enlargement. You can find the speech here – I am only commenting on a few parts of it.

Blair may be a Europhile, but above all, he’s a Blairite, of course. Thus, it is no wonder that the “clear course for Europe” is not so clear in all respects, especially concerning the anticipated debates about the Common European Foreign and Security Policy. Admitting that Britain has “chosen to follow” rather than to lead in Europe for the last 50 years and expressing the clear determination to change her role and perception among her partners –

“First, we must end the nonsense of “this far and no further”. There are areas in which Europe should and will integrate more: in fighting crime and illegal immigration; to secure economic reform; in having a more effective defence and security policy. Britain should not be at the back of the file on such issues but at the front. On the Euro we should of course join if the economic conditions are right. A single currency with a single market for Europe makes economic sense.”

– he also leaves no doubt that more multilateral decision making in some areas will have to be offset by a straightforward implementation of the (somewhat elusive) subsidiarity principle and a clear constitutional statement that the Union has no will to become federal in any sense for some time –

“… we do need a proper Constitution for Europe, one which makes it clear that the driving ideology is indeed a union of nations not a superstate subsuming national sovereignty and national identity. This should be spelt out in simple language. A new Constitution for Europe can bring a new stability to the shape of Europe – not a finality which would prevent any future evolution, but a settlement to last a generation or more.”

– thus, only a slight change of attitude with respect to the above mentioned “this far and not further” position. A recognition of the dynamic nature of the process and some linguistic modernisation rather than a fundamental change in the underlying position.

Concerning the question of an appointed/elected Chairman of the European Council, he proposes a “team presidency” in which different councils would be led by different nations following a rotation scheme like the one currently used for the Council presidency. While the smaller nations will naturally be wary of a long-term Chairman of the European Council, the idea of splitting the presidency will likely appeal to many, as it seems to be a way to increase the number of national representatives without increasing the number of decision making bodies.

But I presume the biggest rows will concern the Common Foreign and Security Policy, especially after the recently floated Franco-German ideas about the Common European Defense. In the end, it’s all about Nato and the currently strained trans-Atlantic relationship. It’s a question of cultural ties as well as of history and of military ability. Very difficult to project any outcome apart from increased defense spending in Europe to somewhat close the apparent capability gap to the US. Realising that foreign policy is again much more related to military engagement, albeit of a very different kind, than it has been for European nations during the cold war years, Blair is favouring European cooperation, but ruling out a communised foreign policy – and he’s got some point there –

I favour the strengthening of European foreign policy, step by step, from the Balkans, to Europe’s “near abroad” and then beyond. In this area, however, the lead responsibility should remain with the Council of Foreign Ministers. Britain cannot agree to the communitisation of defence or foreign policy. It is not practical or right in principle. Foreign policy can only be built by gathering a consensus among the Member States who possess the resources necessary to conduct it – the diplomatic skills, the bulk of aid budgets, and of course the armed forces.”

It will be very hard to come to an agreement regarding extended multilateral decision making in this area. Even Germany, long standing propagator of multilateral decision making is pursuing a unilateral course of (verbal) non-participation regarding a possible US-led attack on Iraq.

In this speech, Blair only slightly touched one of the most difficult things to solve in the future – Turkey. He somewhat confusingly states with respect to Europe’s borders –

“Stretching from Lapland in the north to Malta in the south, from the coast of County Kerry in the West to the Black Sea, and ultimately – yes – to Turkey’s borders in the East, it will contain over 500 million people, a political and economic entity bigger than the USA and Japan put together.”

I haven’t counted if Europe contains over 500 million people without Turkey’s 80 million. But I like the way of getting around the subject by claiming that “Europe will extend to Turkey’s borders” without saying whether he means those with Greece or those with Iraq. That leaves a lot of room for discussion – all of Anatolia, actually.

My guess is, Europe will not be any simpler after this round of institutional changes. It will probably be a lot more complicated.

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German Politics, Germany, Iraq, Political Theory, US Politics, USA

A deeper rift? Some context…

Firstly, a noteworthy article by Robert Kagan concerning the fundamental policy-style differences between Europe and the US, published in May in the Washington Post.

Secondly, The Economist’s analysis of these differences. Thirdly, a paper called “Mutual Perceptions” by Peter Rudolf of the German Institute for Foreign and Strategic Policy (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin), presented at a conference of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies on Sept. 10, 2002.

Some key quotes from the latter :

“The American and the European publics, including the German public are also not so far apart in their view of the world. They do not live on different planets, the one on Mars, the other on Venus, as Robert Kagan`s now famous dictum says. Looking at the collective preferences on both sides of the Atlantic, we are no way drifting apart. In their majority, Americans and Europeans do share a positive view of international institutions, Americans are more multilateral than unilateral oriented; Europeans, even Germans, are by far less opposed to the use of military force, although they are inclined to support it for humanitarian purpose and for upholding international law. Although the use of military means for combating terrorism finds support among a majority of people across Europe, the preferred measures to combat terrorism lie – to a greater extent than among Americans – in the economic realm: in helping poor countries to develop their economies. Thus, Americans and Germans do not live on different planets but those neoconservatives do, those – to quote former President Carter – “belligerent and divisive voices” now seemingly dominant in Washington, those whose vision of America`s role in the world implies a basic strategic reorientation of American foreign policy. Using the dramatically increased perception of vulnerability to asymmetric threats and instrumentalizing the “war on terror” as the legitimizing principle, the hegemonic – or better: the imperial – wing of the conservative foreign policy elite effectively dominated the political discourse and left its imprint on a series of decisions..” (p. 2)

“Should the neoconservatives succeed in turning the United States into a crusader state waging so-called preventive wars, German-American relations will head to further estrangement. If the current debate on Iraq is indicative of things to come, the expectation of American neoconservatives that their European allies will in the end jump on the bandwagon might be disappointed, at least in the German case. In their despise of their irrelevant amoral European allies and in their overconfidence in American hard power resources, they simply ignore the value dimension of the current transatlantic conflicts. It is a conflict about different visions of world order.” (p. 6)

Lastly, for those who can read German, another SWP study – “Preventive war as solution? The USA and Iraq.” For those who don’t read German, the footnotes are a remarkable collection of mostly English language documents concerning the intra-US-administrative discussion as well as the international one. I’ll probably post some key references later.

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Europe. Art. Later.

I will write something about my visit to this year’s dokumenta11 later tonight. For the time being I’ll leave you with the FT’s Quentin Peel and his thoughts about how Germany would act different in Europe under a conservative chancellor (Link).

I think most of that is bollocks. Germany is still as committed to multilateral European governance as it has always been. And there is no way I can think of for Stoiber to change that, even if he wanted to should he become the next chancellor. So the multilateral vs. inter-governmental rift will still see the UK on the one side and Germany on the other.

The new conservative French government is somewhat undecided, tending to intergovernmentalism but, in my opionion, predominantly using that position as a leverage in the negotiations with Germany about who will pick up the Common Agricultural Market bill after the EU’s enlargement.

The French famers are srtill the ones who have understood EU politics best…

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