Schlagwort-Archive: German Politics

German Politics, Iraq

Dear Gerhard,

Why can’t you just cut the crap and just tell us what we already know. Now I know you might not have spoken to many ordinary (that is non party-affiliated) people lately to avoid a heavy beating by angry tax payers. So believe me if I’m telling you that, really, everybody in this country knows that,

  • no, German troops will not actively participate in conquering Bagdad. And let’s face it, Donny & Conny & Tommy (Rumsfeld, Rice, Franks…) are most likely rather grateful that the US armed forces will not have to babysit ze Tschermans while trying ot invade Iraq, but
  • yes, Germany (ahm, you) will do pretty much everything else the US ask for to facilitate their (and token British) strike on Saddam’s regime. Yes, we know that includes all the “eventualities” you still refuse to discuss, especially some sort of involvement of the ABC clearing tanks only deployed in Kuwait for operation Enduring Freedom and those German soldiers in NATO AWACS planes – only “protecting” NATO territory, of course.

Ple-heease. We know you’ve been “framing the truth” all along. And yes, even those who voted for you two months ago knew it. But they liked your irredentist behavior. Bashing the rich and powerful is a natural socialist instinct (which, by the way, all too often led to schizophrenia once socialists had become rich and powerful…) and we like some good political entertainment.

But now we know how the story ends and there’s not too much repeat viewing value to it. So can you please save yourself and all others a lot of time by just telling us what we all know?

P.S.: And while you’re about to make some useful decisions, please fire Olaf Scholz (your party’s general secretary who does not believe Germany needs a makeover). I guess you hired him to make yourself look better in comparison. That’s fair enough. And I guess he did not even understand why he got that job… but seriously, that guy is lowering the level of this comparison to levels rarely seen in postwar politics.

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compulsory reading, German Politics

Why ’68 was so important for Germany.

Not a lot of you will have read Tierry Jonquet’s novel “Rouge. C’est la vie”. It wasn’t a bestseller. It’s a generational novel about love and life of two teenagers in Paris during the infamous 1968 revolts on Boulevard St. Germain, which is exactly where I read it in the Summer of 1998. 30 years later, in a different world. No doubt, Paris saw the most violent expressions of social unrest in ’68. But I contend that in most respects, ’68 was far more important for Germany than for France or any other Western country.

These days, most people over here tend to concentrate on the incentive distorting economic policies implemented in this country during the last 30 years when they talk about the consequences of ’68. And it’s fair enough to say that ’68 was followed by a general shift to the (economic) left in the German party system that led, in combination with the experience of rapid economic growth during the 1950s and ’60s and macroeconomic mismanagement during the oil crises of the 1970s, to a pervasive, somewhat problematic incentive structure in this country. But that’s not the entire story about ’68. And it is plainly unfair not to mention the rest of it – because the rest is much more important than the economic mess which my generation will have to clean up now.

I was born in 1975, so I don’t have any personal memories of what this country was like before 1968. But it must have been a different county. Sometimes people say that 1945 made the difference. And yes, it clearly was 1945 that made the difference – but it did not make that difference in 1945. It happened in 1968. One generation later.

To those who only know contemporary Germany, the image painted by Martha Gellhorn’s brilliant article Is There A New Germany(from the February 1964 issue of the Atlantic), will probably seem slightly bizarre. Sometimes I find it hard to believe how much things have changed since then. There might not have been a new Germany in 1964. But it was clearly about to hatch out. And it did.

In 1968. Let’s not forget about that.

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German Politics

Hayek for Social Democrats.

While reading the following excerpt from a speech called “Flexibility for the Labour Market” given by Germany’s new economics & labour super-secretary Wolfgang Clement’s at a conference in Berlin yesterday, you might become a little confused about the current position of the German Social Democrats on the economic left-right scale. Has the SPD become a proponent of Hayekian laisser-faire econmics instead of state-regulated intervention? Hardly. But let’s see (quick-and-dirty translation by myself)

we tend to continuously pass new legislation to improve social welfare. But this well-meaning attempt can be perverted if those whose lifes are supposed to be improved by new legislation are getting lost and drown in the wave of regulations that are imposed on many different levels. In addition, there is the danger, that too strict rules are making the necessary development of processes more difficult or are preventing them entirely instead of speeding them up.”

But let me assure you: It’s just words. And words can be, at most, a promise for deeds. They are a lot more credible if backed by acredible record or credible committments. The problem with the former is, there is no credible SPD record regarding deregulation for the post 1998 period. Social security reforms, yes, to some extent. But labour market DE-regulation? No. If anything, things have become worse due to the still rampant union inducied insider-outsider problems.

Actually, Clement somewhat recognizes the lack of a record in the excerpt. So past experience does not quite work to help convince the public of the truthfulness of his (speechwriter’s) words.

And there’s the core of the government’s communication problem (which is huge, but evidently pales in comparison to the fiscal and regulatory ones.) It has no idea how to credibly commit itself to the reform rethoric it is once again employing.

That’s why so many people are wary believing the SPD today when it employs libertarian rethoric. They believe it just means further state regulation and more unemployment, however much disguised.

Shame on you if you fool me once, shame on me if you fool me twice…

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German Politics, Germany

Am I giving Schröder too much credit?

The reelected German SPD-led government is having a hard time these days. An opposition spokesperson yesterday stated that it was now offically allowed to call Hans Eichel, the finance minister, a liar (for he said he did not know about the looming deficit before the election) and it will be next to impossible to find a paper not bashing the government for its troubled first weeks. The Economist is no exception here.

While almost everybody (except for the powerful service union leader Bsirske, who publicly stated this weekend that he has yet to see the crisis) agrees that Germany is badly in need of some deregulation, especially concerning the labour market, things are a lot harder to do than to talk about. Especially given the troubled economy which will make it much more difficult for the government to produce visible results after much needed structural reforms.

To reform the labour markets is one important step. But it is a politically troublesome one if it only means to cut welfare without more people actually getting jobs because of lacking demand.

And it is a politically even more troublesome step if the powerful unions, as always pursuing their insider-ousider game, are cashing in their price for supporting the chancellor when his campaign looked the bleakest last summer.

So what is the government doing? It is proposing a problematic incoherent austerity package in combination with redistributive measures which the unions approve of but which are increasingly despised of by a growing majority of people.

However, I believe, the chancellor thinks he can play a game because most of those laws have to be approved by the upper chamber of the Bundestag, the Bundesrat, in which the conservative opposition (CDU) currently holds a majority. So he proposes legislation to service the unions knowing it does not pose a great risk supposing the opposition will block it anyway.

After that he will be able to tell the unions to keep quiet whilst actually going to reform things.

Am I giving Schröder too much credit? There’s one big problem with such a strategy: It depends on the key players to silently cooperate. If the CDU actually lets some the “union-reforms” get through the upper chamber in the hopes that the following implementation will anger a significant amount of previous Schröder voters it won’t work. And if Schröder can’t credibly blame the opposition for blocking the union-proposals, he will not be able to escape the unions’ embrace.

It’s a risky strategy and, of course, I don’t know if it’s actually what is happening. But it does make strategic sense to me. The SPD has probably already lost the two upcoming regional elections because of the revelation of the ever increasing deficit just after the general elections (which the government is only partly to blame for). Should that also be the perception of the government and the opposition leaders, the silent cooperation may have already begun.

We’ll see.

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German Politics, US Politics

See? Again stuck in the middle.

Dimplomacy is a difficult art of communication. History is full of examples of unskilled German diplomacy. Looking at Europe’s history I sometimes think Germany should join France and let the Quai d’Orsay handle things for us… As for examples, here’s one more:

While the US administration is still sulking following Gerhard Schroeder’s campaign promise that Germany would not participate in a military action against Iraq (note: apart from all the stuff the pacifist public won’t be able to see and possibly more after the Weapon inspectors will have been thrown out early next year and Germany will be the chair of the UN Security Council from Febuary 2003 on when the war resolution will likely be voted on.), Osama bin Laden (or what/whoever is threatening the Western World and Russia using this name) is threatening Germany for its cooperation with the US.

So after praising the terrorist attacks on civilians in Tunisia, Karachi, Bali and Moscow he asks – “What are your governments intentions in allying themselves against the Muslims with this bunch of criminals in the White House? Don’t your governments know that these criminals in the White House are the biggest slaughterers of these times? [..] I’m explicitly naming Great Britain, France, Italy, Canada, Germany and Australia.” (retranslated from German – source). Stuck in the middle.

OK, I know that the recent row with the US administration was not about cooperation in the war against terror but about different approaches in strategic foreign policy. I also know that being on Osama’s list is a consequence of Germany (now) being an integral part of the west and not a consequence of any specific kind of anti-terrorist cooperation. The list therefore is also a confirmation that the main German policy goal since WW2, integration in the west, has been successful.

So we’re possibly good at structure. But definitely bad at diplomacy ;-).

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German Politics, Germany, Iraq, Political Theory, US Politics, USA

A deeper rift? Some context…

Firstly, a noteworthy article by Robert Kagan concerning the fundamental policy-style differences between Europe and the US, published in May in the Washington Post.

Secondly, The Economist’s analysis of these differences. Thirdly, a paper called “Mutual Perceptions” by Peter Rudolf of the German Institute for Foreign and Strategic Policy (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin), presented at a conference of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies on Sept. 10, 2002.

Some key quotes from the latter :

“The American and the European publics, including the German public are also not so far apart in their view of the world. They do not live on different planets, the one on Mars, the other on Venus, as Robert Kagan`s now famous dictum says. Looking at the collective preferences on both sides of the Atlantic, we are no way drifting apart. In their majority, Americans and Europeans do share a positive view of international institutions, Americans are more multilateral than unilateral oriented; Europeans, even Germans, are by far less opposed to the use of military force, although they are inclined to support it for humanitarian purpose and for upholding international law. Although the use of military means for combating terrorism finds support among a majority of people across Europe, the preferred measures to combat terrorism lie – to a greater extent than among Americans – in the economic realm: in helping poor countries to develop their economies. Thus, Americans and Germans do not live on different planets but those neoconservatives do, those – to quote former President Carter – “belligerent and divisive voices” now seemingly dominant in Washington, those whose vision of America`s role in the world implies a basic strategic reorientation of American foreign policy. Using the dramatically increased perception of vulnerability to asymmetric threats and instrumentalizing the “war on terror” as the legitimizing principle, the hegemonic – or better: the imperial – wing of the conservative foreign policy elite effectively dominated the political discourse and left its imprint on a series of decisions..” (p. 2)

“Should the neoconservatives succeed in turning the United States into a crusader state waging so-called preventive wars, German-American relations will head to further estrangement. If the current debate on Iraq is indicative of things to come, the expectation of American neoconservatives that their European allies will in the end jump on the bandwagon might be disappointed, at least in the German case. In their despise of their irrelevant amoral European allies and in their overconfidence in American hard power resources, they simply ignore the value dimension of the current transatlantic conflicts. It is a conflict about different visions of world order.” (p. 6)

Lastly, for those who can read German, another SWP study – “Preventive war as solution? The USA and Iraq.” For those who don’t read German, the footnotes are a remarkable collection of mostly English language documents concerning the intra-US-administrative discussion as well as the international one. I’ll probably post some key references later.

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almost a diary, German Politics, US Politics

Start spreading the news, I’m leaving today.

Believe it or not, this weeek of travel diary, easily consumable blog-entries is nearing its end. I guess it’s hard to have a bad time in New York, and I am no exception to that rule. I met friends of old days, and I made new ones. I love metropoles. There’s always something to discover. Like yesterday evening, when I was walking down East 43rd Street, looking for a theatre, I could not find. But then, 3 minutes later, I was sitting in the second row of a Bruce Hornsby jam session. Entirely unplanned. And it was great. This is what differentiates cities like New York from the likes of Frankfurt (in addition to the fact that they don’t need a qualifier concerning their location). Metropoles are cities that never sleep. However, sleeping is something I am looking forward to doing at home. The next entry will be from the old world again.

P.S.: I haven’t written anything about the Bush-Schroeder-Daeubler-Gmelin quarrels so far, because I sent my reply to William Safire of the New York Times. So I am waiting for a reply first. But you’ll be able to read my rebuttal of his NYTimes column, “The German Problem”, in this theatre, soon.

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German Politics, Iraq, US Politics

America pissed off?

The last few days have witnessed histerical German media. Apparently, the US administration is not amused by the chancellor stating his disapproval for an invasion of Iraq as clearly as possible. A lot of analysts think that the US are right to be pissed off because they think that Schroeder is simply using the topic for his campaign (if so, it did certainly pay off), therefore creating unnecessary international tension and that he will later be forced to do anyway what he says he won’t before the election (should he be reelected).

Two things to that: One, the Iraq discussion certainly is a party political issue in the US as well. There is a lot of discussion going on. I don’t think it’s fair to denounce that in other countries, simply because they have upcoming general elections. In addition, if the discussion is owed to campaigning it should not be taken seriously anyway. But if the US government thinks that its foreign policy has to be treated at some level far above day to day politics, they should think again. Policies that are affecting everybody’s interests in the most crucial ways have to be discussed publicly. That’s crucial to a liberal democracy. Sometimes dissent is unavoidable.

Two, isn’t it great? So many Europeans lamenting about the US government not listening to its allies. And now that. I don’t think the issue has received the same kind of attention in the US – especially not during the week before 9/11/2002 – but who can say that they don’t listen to what we say if the chancellor can stir up so much attention once he says no? And he’s just the bad European of the day. Blair, the good European is having tea with W in Camp David this weekend. Honestly, isn’t it a bit like good cop, bad cop? Do the European foreign policy strategists think that treating the US from two angles is increasing its influence? I wonder…

But anyway – things probably aren’t as bad between the old and the new world as typical crisis hunting journalists on either would love them to be. The US government knows that Europe, including Germany, will support it, should it actually go in. Military support will probably be limited to showcase troops – simply because there isn’t anything useful Europe has that the US has not (maybe apart from this German ABC clearing unit already deployed in Kuwait). But Europe will probably pick up a large part of the tab by providing controlling and nation building resources after the initial intervention. Just as in Afghanistan. If we like it or not.

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German Politics, oddly enough

User’s guide to buying votes in Germany

Ebay is definitely faster than political scientists.

The latter still have to finally decide whether voting is rational. Actually, from a strict rational choice perspective, it isn’t. The infinitesimal decision making power of any individual vote cast in general elections does not justify the amount of resources committed to the act of voting.

But still, people DO vote, for whichever reason. And not only do a lot of people vote, some of them also attribute a much higher value to the infinitesimal influence of an individual vote than most of us would anticipate as this story, published by Spiegel Online, about people trying to sell their right to vote on ebay.de confers.

Needless to say, it’s illegal to do so, which is why you will no longer find the auctions mentioned in the article on ebay. As soon as they’re notified about such auctions, the auctions will be blocked.

But despite the illegality of such auctions, I wonder whether they could not become a prime research laboratory concerning questions like the one mentioned above? I would really like to know how much people would be willing to pay for the assurance of someone they have only had e-contact with to vote for their preferred party in the seclusion of the voting booth – in a month.

Why should the sellers even think about honouring their commitment if there is no way for the buyers to check the results? It’s plain moral hazard. Which mechanisms would sellers develop to credibly bind themselves to an uncontrollable as well as unenforcable agreement? Why did they have to block these auctions? This is the stuff prime economists get their Nobel prices for.

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