Schlagwort-Archive: US Politics

German Politics, Iraq, US Politics

William Safire. Again.

William Safire does have a problem. He is seemingly fascinated with a country he does not have a real clue about – Germany. However, as opposed to his recent rantings about Franco-German attempts to dominate the world, in today’s NYTimes column he does make two real points.

Firstly, he is talking about last week’s PR campaign by 8-10 European leaders and the problem of “representing Europe”, secondly, he thinks about the necessity of basing US troops in Germany following teh end of the Cold War and a thought-experiment by a US general.

First things first. Mr Safire writes –

“Leaders of eight European nations – not just Britain, but Italy, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Denmark – had signed an op-ed statement supporting the U.S. stand on Saddam and in effect asserting that Germany and France did not speak for Europe. Schröder was flabbergasted; he had no idea that this rejection of his anti-U.S. crusade was in the works. Think about that: a Wall Street Journal request started the round-robin letter; eight nations weighed in on its drafting and redrafting for days; but Germany’s chancellor, with his vast intelligence system and diplomatic corps, was totally in the dark.”

There’s a lot in this paragraph: Firstly, Schroeder in all likelihood knew about the letter, as Welt am Sonntag reported yesterday. However, that does not make much of a difference in any political sense – he did not sign the letter, which, by the way, does not even really differ from the German position. Did you read it? It is a call for peaceful disarmement and expression of gratitude for US involvement in Europe since WW2.

Schroeder could have signed it without factually compromising his position on Iraq. But, obviously, the world’s (and worse, the German) media would have framed it differently. So he did not do i – days before important by-elections which his party seemed bound to lose (and lose it did, big time). On the other hand, the fact that Schroeder could have signed indicates that the letter’s content is not too controversial in Europe.

Secondly, there’s the question of “speaking for Europe”. However much I am personally disappointed by the way Schroeder is doing everything he can to make things worse – don’t get me started on last weekend’s “proposal” -, he would never claim to speak for Europe. I believe that it was the US media which created a rift between “Europe” and the “US” which then led to a perception in which “the Weasels” represent “Europe”. Donny complicated things with his “age”-qualifiers. However, the opinion of European peoples is in all likelihood a lot closer to the rethoric of Chirac and Schroeder than it is to the one of the likes of Richard Perle. Even though no British person would ever admit it, according to most polls I see, even British opinion (including that of Blair’s backbenchers) is better represented by Schroeder or Chirac than by their own Prime Minister. Also, thinking about representation, here’s a nice extract written by Charles Utwater II in a comment to a post in Brad DeLong’s blog. I could not have stated it better myself..

While the Wall Street Journal, with the connivance of Tony Blair and the Prime Minister of Spain managed to get the signatures of eight European leaders, those signatures do not represent the will of the people of those countries. Indeed, Vaclav Havel resigned the day after signing, and the Czech government repudiated his signature. The Spanish Prime Minister was taken to task by the president. Silvio Berlusconi of Italy is under threat of indictment as a mafioso and is not a particularly popular figure at the moment. Italy has had some of the largest anti-war demonstrations in Europe. And so on down the list. About 70% of Europeans oppose war in Iraq under current conditions, and even if the UN produces a resolution, about 40-50% oppose.

I think that says it all. Surely, the will of the people is not as important in a democracy as the will of their leaders if it comes to deploying troops. But it still is of minor importance every now and then in elections. Ask W., he should know about the intricacies of electoral systems.

The point being? Even though Schroeder is handling the current situation as badly as Richard Perle must have hoped for, he is not totally out of tune with the European public.

Then, Mr Safire goes on to tell us straight to the face how little he knows about Germany –

“Germany’s new opposition leader, the Thatcheresque Angela Merkel, joined the defining issue as her conservative party’s past candidate had failed to do. She said of the anti-Saddam op-ed: “if we had been in government, Germany would have signed that letter.”

Thatcherite (isn’t it?) Angela Merkel. I am in stitches. She will love it, too. I bet she has alreay printed a copy of the column and hung next to the Helmut Kohl portrait in her office. I’m kidding. But let’s remember – Margaret Thatcher was a tough British Prime Minister. Angela Merkel is a rather weak German opposition leader. She’s not even uncontested in her own party. And she’s the leader of an opposition that is continuously embarrassing itself by not being able and/or willing to take any real stance in the Iraq issue. Let’s face it – Angela Merkel is as thatcherite as W is a Democrat. She does not have a firm (published) opinion on Iraq and neither has her party. She probably would not have signed the letter as party-leader as it was published before the by-elections in Hessen and Lower-Saxony. And I bet she would not have signed the letter as a chancellor. But as opposition leader without a firm opinion, after the by-elections, and without having been asked to sign in first place, she can now say whatever she wants without the fear of having to act on it later on.

The point being? Mr. Safire entirely misrepresents the mood and the leadership of the CDU/CSU conservative opposition (which is now, after the by elections, via the upper chamber, the Bundesrat, effectively a part of the federal government for all important legislative initiatives).

The last part of the article is concerned with the “European free riding” argument I made several times before. Even though Mr. Safire admits that proposed plans for deployment reductions in Germany are not some sort of punishment for the German chancellor, I suppose it’s not entirely coincidental that the US are starting to think about their continental European bases right now – this is what he refers to.

“a briefing in Brussels Friday of a U.S. Congressional delegation led by McCain and Lieberman by the new NATO supreme commander, U.S. Marine Gen. James Jones,
revealed a developing U.S. strategy. It holds that the 70,000 U.S. troops garrisoned in Germany, accompanied by their 70,000 dependents, make up too many forces with too outdated a mission stationed too far from potential trouble at too high a cost.”

Concerning this potentially crucial development, there are two main political issues which will have to be decided rather quickly following the Iraq war – will the imperialists remain the dominating force of the Republican party or can the libertarians regain some ground, especially in foreign policy? The former faction will not be too interested in closing bases. The latter likely will. Secondly, realizing this, what will Germany’s and Europe’s reaction be? Backing down for free security? Not an unlikely possibility given the budgetary situation of many European countries, especially Germany. Or will Europe begin to invest more into its own security? The last alternative will likely mean more distributive battles and less political stability in the medium run, with an uncertain long run.

Difficult alternatives. But no one said being Chancellor would be easy.

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compulsory reading, German Politics, Iraq, US Politics

Further Right.

An article published by Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at Washington’s libertarian Cato Institute and former advisor to Ronald Reagon, indicates to me that the real rift concerning foreign policy could be neither the Atlantic nor the middle aisles in the chambers of the US Congress. It indicates to me that there seems to be a deep divide between socially conservative Republicans and Libertarian Reoublicans in the US.

The conservative, traditional, hierarchical model of social coordination favoured by the former is usually abhorred by the latter’s assertion that laisser-faire is the only just way to organise a society/economy. Of course, a two party system does not offer too many alternatives if you want to “make votes count” (Gary W. Cox’ book is really brilliant!), so both faction have teamed-up due to their even stronger disgust of the plans for social and! economic reengineering proposed by those who sit on the other side of the aisles. But from time to time, the internal divisions surface. Current US foreign policy is an example thereof.

In this article, which appeared in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung last Friday (link in English), Bandow pratically asks France and Germany to stand firm in their opposition to a US led war on Iraq –

“If Berlin and Paris back down after publicly avowing their opposition to war in such strong terms, they will reinforce the justifiable contempt in which they are held in Washington. And U.S. administrations will continue to ignore them in foreign crises. The credibility of European and other critics of Washington is at stake. Giving in will feed Washington’s conviction that it can impose its will without constraint.”

Bandow’s opinion does not look too isolated if you have a look at this page, which is listing the body of work Cato scholars have done since 911 regarding a potential U.S. war with Iraq.

However, if you compare Bandow’s view (or even the piece by Eric Alterman I already linked some days ago) to this interpretation of the US-European problems by the Carnegy Endowment’s (neoconservative) Robert Kagan, you’ll clearly sense a difference not only in style, but in content, too.

Kagan is a vocal proponent of what he calls “American benevolent hegemony“. And it seems, those who share his opinion are willing to pick up the tab for continued American hegemony – inducing all the parallels I already referred to on January 20th. Bandow, on the other hand does not see a point in paying for hegemony – and this is not just a different financial assessment. It’s a different world-view.

“Still, it is understandable why Europe has so little influence over American policy. Europe as a whole is a security black hole for America. … Providing a handful of special forces and lending a couple of AWACS planes would not have been necessary were the U.S. not devoting a substantial share of its military to defending Europe.

The Europeans would do far more for America by simply garrisoning their own continent, instead of expecting the U.S. to maintain 100,000 troops to protect populous, prosperous industrialized states, as well as another 13,000 to enforce order in the Balkans, a region of no strategic interest to America.”

He realises that Europe’s attitude may be one of rational free riding. But that, of course, feeds US demands of eternal subservience, which Europe is seemingly less willing to swallow these days.

In the end, the Iraq crisis is teaching all parties involved that it’s impossible to have the cake, and eat it, too – in Bandow’s words (from last September) –

“… neither side has conducted itself with much maturity in the ongoing international spat. The Bush administration believes that allies such as Germany should do what it says, no questions asked. The Schroeder administration believes that Germany deserves a significant say in international relations, while shrinking its military and relying on Washington to resolve tough global problems. … The administration wants doormats, not allies. Germany and Europe don’t have to remain irrelevant, however. The Schroeder- Bush fight offers Berlin and other European states a unique opportunity to strike a more independent course. It’s time for Washington to encourage such a change.”

As for the last sentence of the quote, the current administration does not seem to listen to Mr Bandow. At least, not yet. As always, time will tell.

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Iraq, US Politics

Seriously, guys.

Sorry for the lack of updates. I will write more later, but this one could not wait.

I just checked the MIT’s blogdex and found an “instapundit.com” entry ranked #38. The entry links this article concerning the increasing isolation of France and Germany following yesterday’s Aznar-Bush advertising campaign. Today, Slovakia and Albania signed up, too. Remember Albania? The county that virtually attacked the US in Barry Levinson’s “Wag The Dog“?

Anyway, Albania is not what I wanted to talk about. As Glenn Reynolds rightly notices –

The article goes on to minimize (if that’s possible) the military importance of Albania and Slovakia.

But then he says something which I could not find in the article he linked to and which really makes me wonder about the quality of information out there these days.
He goes on to say –

“But that’s not the point. The point is that — despite (or because of) their diplomatic anschluss — France and Germany are now isolated within the E.U. Indeed, there is now talk that the E.U. may splinter as a result of their anti-American efforts.”

Excuse me? Let me repeat it for your reading pleasure.

“Indeed, there is now talk that the E.U. may splinter as a result of their anti-American efforts.”

How far is Europe from the US again? Seriously guys, it does make a huge difference to say that

a) the joint European position, which EU foreign ministers agreed on last Monday is about to splinter as a result of non-reconcilable positions – as actually stated in the linked article – or that

b) the EU, a supranational entity with a common market, which is performing governmental, legislative and judicial functions for its member states could be disbanded because of a foreign policy dispute regarding Iraq. However important the Iraq-question may have become – such a proposition is sheer and utter nonsense.

Mr Reynolds also rather doubts the proposition, adding that –

“[t]hat probably won’t happen…”

No, it will CERTAINLY NOT happen. I really wonder if this proposition has actually been made, and if so, by whom? And why?

It is this kind of avoidable disinformation does make me angry. Seriously.

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German Politics, Iraq, US Politics

Now we’re talking…

Now look at that.

If ‘old’ Europe’s support were indeed as damn irrelevant to the US administration as many of its senior officials have repeatedly stated – why, then, would someone like Richard Perle, chairman of the Pentagon’s defense advisory board and one of the key figures behind the Bush administration’s Irak policy, find the time to appear on German tv for a six minute interview on the day of the President’s “State Of The Union” address?

And believe it or not – while firmly restating the well known simple WMD based argument for attacking Iraq – he often referred to European “friends“, not weasels, that do not share the US administration’s point of view in many respects. I have to say, for someone who (seriously?) stated after last year’s German election that

“[t]he best thing would be for [German chancellor Gerhard Schröder] to resign…”,

this appears to be a quite remarkable change of communication strategy.

So maybe Bush won’t add France and Germany to the “Axis of Evil” tonight ;-). And maybe, his speechwriters have realised by now that they are not simply writing for their neoconservative constituency. Maybe, they have realised that a lot of Americans do care about the world’s, and thus – also – ‘old’ Europe’s opinion, and that international opposition can damage approval ratings – at least before America goes to war. Maybe they have realised that Harvard’s Joseph Nye may have had a point (even though he was a Clinton official, and thus also some sort of honorary weasel) when he described The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone. Maybe they have realised that, tonight, their words will be examined by the entire world.

Maybe this is wishful thinking. But maybe, the world will be spared from another “Axis of Evil” tonight – I certainly hope so.

I recently read a review of “The Right Man”, a book containing some insights into the Bush administration, written by David Frum, a former speechwriter. In this review, Jeffrey A. Tucker writes –

“Remember the famous “Axis of Evil” phrase? It was originally “Axis of Hatred,” and it was written by Frum. Why? Frum writes: “Bush decided that the United States was no longer a status-quo power in the Middle East. He wanted to see plans for overthrowing Saddam, and he wanted a speech that explained to the world why Iraq’s dictator must go. And from that presidential decision, bump, bump, bump down the hierarchy… to me.”

Again, what can this mean? Bush knew he wanted to get rid of Saddam but didn’t know why? He hires people like Frum to drum up some, any, rationale?”

Stories like these do not automatically disqualify the political goal to oust Saddam. But they are clearly not helpful to win a sceptical world’s support. So now, let’s hear what the US President is going to tell us this year. Oh, and while we’re watching, we might as well have a little fun.

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US Politics

USA Oui! Bush Non!

The Nation’s Eric Alterman has written a rather witty account of the myths concerning European anti-Americanism enstrangement. It’s a bit like the Timothy Garton Ash piece – but written looking at the Eiffel Tower instead of the Empire State building. And it’s a bit more fun to read.

One of the most surprising things he says is that for him, even these days, Europe is the cooler America. He even (somewhat) denies that there is real Anti-Americanism in Europe –

“You can tell a lot about a continent by the way it reacts to Bruce Springsteen. Tonight, at the Bercy Stadium, the typically multigenerational, sold-out Springsteen audience could be from Anytown, USA. […] You can’t be anti-American if you love Bruce Springsteen. You can criticize America. You can march against America’s actions in the world. You can take issue with the policies of its unelected, unusually aggressive and unthinking Administration, and you can even get annoyed with its ubiquitous cultural and commercial presence in your life. But you can’t be anti-American.”

– and –

“What most Europeans seem to recognize is that this is a big, beautiful and damn complicated country. For every George Bush, we have a Spike Lee. For every Charlton Heston, we have a Paul Newman. For every Lee Greenwood, there’s a Lauryn Hill or a Wynton Marsalis.”

However, he draws the same conclusion regarding the American political and social divide as Garton Ash and so many other do these days. And he cites an article from “Le Monde Diplomatique” sharing my opinion that “old” Europe might have even gone along with a US led invasion of Iraq had the case been made by Bill Clinton instead of W –

“It’s not as if Europeans can’t stand the idea of a conservative Republican President. To a surprising degree, they warmed to Ronald Reagan, as Alain Frachon, who writes about foreign affairs on the editorial page of Le Monde, explains. ‘When Reagan was President, we never had the impression he was motivated by fundamentalism. He was divorced. He had worked in Hollywood. But this George Bush is totally foreign to us. He quotes the Bible every two or three sentences. He is surrounded by Christian fundamentalists. He says he has no problem sleeping after sending someone to death. There was a dose of charm, humor, of Hollywood to Reagan. But not to Bush. It’s another world and one we find extraordinarily hypocritical. No one told us that the Republicans had moved this far to the right.’ Things were quite different under Bill Clinton. As Serge Halimi, the leftist editor of Le Monde diplomatique, the publication that is frequently accused of being the intellectual home of the anti-American worldview, argues, ‘The hostility to US policy would be lessened with Clinton in the White House, even assuming that these policies were exactly the same as Bush’s.'”

And just as I do, Mr Alterman believes there is hope for the eagle and the weasel –

“There is a pro-American world out there, in Europe in particular but elsewhere as well. It is just waiting for an America it can respect as well as admire. For all the intentional insults this Administration has thrown their way, our European well-wishers have not given up on what’s best in us, no matter how often they feel forced to voice their frustration with the leaders our fundamentally flawed political system presents them with.” (emphasis added)

But there is one thing in the article which, I think, is not exactly true, and which some people in the British Tory party will find clearly insulting –

“Even most of the conservative parties in Europe are to the left of the Democrats in [America].”

Oh my, should Ian Duncan Smith read this he will make them shift even further to the right…

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compulsory reading, German Politics, media, US Politics, USA

What does it take to publish in the NY Times?

Firstly, let me admit that I chose this entry’s title to avoid Brad DeLong’s (in)famous “Why does the NY Times publish such Dreck”. Secondly, let me answer the question: Apparently, at least sometimes, not too much, it seems to me.

Yesterday, William Safire, a Pulitzer Price winner, published a tale about Germany’s self-evident imperial ambitions in Europe, the usually spineless French, and a Chancellor, who “does not share the free speech values of the West”. Since I do value free speech, I would like to assert that, of course, Mr. Safire is, just as everyone else, entitled to whichever opinion he chooses to hold, be it stupid or intelligent, informed or ignorant. Likewise, he is obviously entitled to have it published it in whichever form he – or a publisher – sees fit.

However, quality becomes an issue when innocent, unwitting others rely on published opinion because they think the person actually does know a little about the stuff he is writing about. In his latest book, Stupid White Men, the American author and director Michael Moore – who is, in my opinion, in many respects just as stupid as the (other) white men to whom he dedicated the book (“Bowling For Columbine” is so much better!) – presented an interesting example of the problem I am talking about. In the chapter titled “Idiot Nation” he speculates that America’s

“… problem is isn’t just that [the] kids don’t know nothin’ but that the adults who pay their tuition are no better … What if we were to give a pop quiz to the commentators who cram our TVs and radios with all their nonstop nonsense.”

He then describes how a magazine columnist called Fred Barnes (who I suppose might be somewhat famous in the US) whined in a talk-show

“… about the sorry state of American education, blaming the teachers and their evil union for [the fact that] … ‘These kids don’t even know what The Iliad and The Odyssey are!”. But when Moore called Barnes the next day to find out what exactly The Iliad and The Odyssey are the only thing Barnes could reply was “Well, they’re… uh… you know… uh… okay, fine, you got me – I don’t know what they’re about. Happy now?” (all quotes from the English Penguin edition, page 91)

The quality of arguments becomes even more important if it should be true that, as more and more people seem to assume, serious public policy debates in the USA are confined to the pages of the “liberally biased” NY Times and the Washington Post these days (note to European readers: I always find the American use of “liberal” extremely confusing, it means something once represented by the “Whig” faction in Parliament, but is clearly different from the European (political) usage of the word, either with a small or a capital “l”.)

Thus, if it weren’t for the fact that Mr Safire’s essay has been published (and is #7 of the 25 most emailed NY Times articles) on the day on which Donald Rumsfeld stated that France and Germany have become “problems”, I would have had a good laugh, shaken my head in disbelief and then turned the page. There are clearly more important things to worry about than the demons haunting a seemingly notorious Kraut-basher.

I stated often enough that I don’t mind Kraut bashing. But Mr Safire’s column amounts at least to blatant misrepresentation, and possibly to worse.
After repeating that Schroeder won last September’s elections on an anti-American ticket, which is true to some extent, but mostly overstated in relation to the boost his campaign got from managing the floods in East Germany, he goes on to describe how Schroeder went to Paris last week in order to “rule the world” – the most stunning feature of the column. Germany allegedly

“offered Chirac an offer he could not refuse: to permanently assert Franco-German dominance over the 23 other nations of Continental Europe … The German design is apparently to saw off the Atlantic part of the Atlantic Alliance, separating Britain and the U.S. from a federal Europe dominated by Germany and France (with France destined to become the junior partner).”

Am I hallucinating or did I just read this for real?

Mr Safire is evidently referring to last week’s Franco-German proposal to create a double-headed European Union leadership by creating an government-elected President of the Council (“a Franco-German Czar“, according to Mr Safire – should he be referring to Dennis MacShane’s FT interview he should note that Mr MacShane was talking about a single elected commission president, when he warned of a new European “Kaiser“) and a parliament-elected and Council-approved President of the European Commission.

Entirely disregarding the vocal German opposition to the proposal which more than anything else displayed a rift between the chancellor, who is said to have favoured the French institutional propositions, and his foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, who has always favoured a single, parliament-elected head for the EU, as well as the longstanding and well-known British position to oppose any institutional design but a single long-term elected President of the Council, Mr Safire continues – “In a stunning power play in Brussels, Germany and France moved to change the practice of having a rotating presidency of the European Council, which now gives smaller nations influence, to a system with a long-term president.” I won’t go into all the details or even seriously argue for reasons of time and space, but let me just tell you that his “argument” doesn’t end here.

This is probably the most ridiculous, blatant, and unashamed display of ignorance regarding the complex decision making process of the European Union I have ever read. Let me restate this: I hope it *is* simply a most ridiculous, blatant, and unashamed display of ignorance, because if it is not just that, the only possible alternative is malevolent propaganda.

But let me state one thing I read last year in a strategic US policy report on post cold war France by Steven Phillip Kramer. Clearly, the Franco-German post-WW2 alliance of “the bomb and the Bundesbank” had to readjust following the seismic shock which the German reunification signified. But even back in 1994, Mr Kramer warned US policy makers not to force Germany to decide between its two most prominent allies and friends, the US and France. Germany, he wrote, does not want to choose. But any American administration should know that, if once forced to decide between the two, Germany would opt for France, for an endless number of historical and geostrategic reasons. I am not sure yet, but maybe we are witnessing the making of this decision.

The last section of Mr. Safire’s essay is concerned with Schroeder’s judicial victoriey prohibiting the German press from reprinting last year’s allegation that he could dye his hair (hence the title of the column – Bad Herr Dye) or any story about marital problems without any proof. This injunction, he says, reminds him of “an unfortunate tradition of judicial deference to executive policies once demonstrated by German courts.” Now here, he must be kidding. How a serious journalist can actually allege that vain attempts to keep up a journalistic ethos are reminiscient of a fascist court system is beyond me. It must have something to do with the demons I invoked above.

The following paragraph is also startling – he restates the inadequacy of the current UN security council veto right system (since France has threatened to veto a second resolution on Iraq following next Monday’s presentation of the weapon inspectors’ current results) saying that

“… the idle French threat … reminds populous and powerful nations like India and Japan of the inequity of mid-sized France having the veto power, and of the need to prevent Germany from getting it.”

Sure, I guess there is hardly anyone in this world who would not agree that a system designed immediately after WW2 and designed to prevent the nuclear holocaust is not necessarily an institution representing today’s geostrategic reality. But as no veto power will ever voluntarily renounce to their veto if the UN structure is not entirely redesigned at the same time, I actually don’t wonder what Condi (Rice) would say to his proposal to let India and Japan (or Brasil, or Pakistan) in as well. I’m sure she would be thrilled by the idea…

In the end, Mr Safire offers at least some insight into his worldview –

The chancellor’s Pyrrhic victories are part of the backdrop to the existential crisis that the Security Council is bringing on itself. The Iraq issue is not war vs. peace. It is collective security vs. every nation for itself.” So if the Security Council is not willing to comply with the US proposal that is in itself proof enough the system is in an existencial crisis. Let me translate for you: only if the world does what America wants can a system of collective security work. Donny (Rumsfeld) will be proud of his words.

And why, exactly, is it that some – well meaning – Americans wonder why there are people in Europe who forget the risk the Iraq poses while oppposing the “Bush junta” (as John LeCarre formulated in the London Times last week). Clearly, Chirac and Schroeder are none of those. But there’s a real chance people might actually listen to what the US has today (and they do have something to say) if the likes of Donald Rumsfeld and William Safire actually learned how to talk.

I don’t know about Schroeder’s hair. But it seems to me, William Safire plays with a too hot straightening iron while writing his columns…

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Political Theory, US Politics

Universal Draft.

The whole Iraq thing makes me think about draft armies.

Going into Iraq or not is not simply a question of removing Saddams WMDs or his entire regime [ note: did anybody see today’s Dubya footage on CNN? He said, and I think I am quoting, “that guy has WMDs. Those are the worst weapons available”. Seriously, I am willing to try not to underestimate W because of his apparent lack of eloquence and good marks in college (like, eg, Norman Mailer and about 95% of Europeans do) but there is a limit to what I can bear in the name of populistic simplification. Quotes like the one above are way beyond that threshold. ] long term energy supply or even helping one of the many oppressed peoples of this world to rid themselves of those villains who pose as their government. It is also a question shaking some of the core values of liberal democracy.

War cannot be regarded as a just another cost category in a diplomatic game. It is not barely an extension of the political – the times of von Clausewitz have long passed. Or so most people, and I think, politicicians, used to think.

The changing geo-strategic landscape during the 1990s led me to the conclusion that large universal draft armies will likely be worse than smaller, professional volunteer armies when it comes to providing international security in a rapidly changing environment. In a world surprised by new varieties of mostly ethnically, nationally, or religiously motivated armed (often distributional) conflicts. The nature of threats to national security had changed, as was most dramatcially illustrated on September 11, 2001. As a consequence, a universal draft seemed no longer justified to many. The most prominent example thereof is certainly the French draft abandonment in 1997.

Small, mobile volunteer armies (navies, air forces) clearly are better equipped and trained than a draft army could ever be. Their professionality allows a peace-keeping and peace-making deployments in areas and conflicts unconceivable for draft armies whose predominant task was to defend their own country.

However, in conjunction with the public’s perceived virtualisation of war (just think of this one image of the flat-screen laden US control cetre in Quatar that CNN airs all the time), a lowered individual risk for the soldiers involved reduces the political risk associated with the pursuit of armed conflicts. Sure, moral convictions will matter to most – to some extent. Chances are, we are wittnessing that war is again becoming publicly perceived of as just another means of politics, just as it was – a long time ago. Of course, from a perspective of Realpolitik (one of the few non violent German contributions to the English language…) the use of military power was, and will probably always depend on a political and economic cost/benefit calculation. But, among many others, the very fact that this was not an acceptable argument kept the costs higher than they seem to be today.

I doubt this sentiment is uniquely American, although the US is clearly the concept’s most prominent advocate at the moment. But I suppose things are going to change in Europe, too. On New Year’s Eve, I bet a German officer that Germany is going to build a first Aircraft Carrier until 2010. This is troubling, of course. The kind of conflicts we are facing today are unlikely to disappear in the near future. Volunteer armies clearly are the best military response – should response be deemed unavoidable. Thus the problem – is the disappearance of draft armies indicating an inflation of “unavoidable” conflicts? Just as the Vietnam experience demonstrated to the US that non defensive draft soldier deployments are almost unfeasable in a democracy because of societal opposition.

As said above, draft armies would be far less effective in most modern kinds of conflict (well, according to those who pretend to know about these things). So universal draft would not actually solve the problem at hand – how can today’s liberal democracies keep a professional army as well as create new cost categories for decision makers to increase the political risk associated with armed conflicts without a unversial draft?

I have no idea. But I think that is actually a very important question.

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compulsory reading, Iraq, US Politics

Parallels.

Lately, I’ve been thinking about some historic parallels that could provide a usually forgotten perspective concerning the “transatlantic rift“.

I’ve been thinking about a tale of exploitation from Eastern Europe. At least from the 1980s on, probably even before, Eastern European satellite states materially exploited the Soviet Union because they traded administratively overpriced low quality manufactured goods for world market priced raw materials. The Soviets probably knew what was going on, but thinking about Poland’s Solidarnosc experience they supposedly realised that there was a price to pay for continued hegemony in the 1980s.

I know I am restating the obvious but as the world does certainly not suffer from scarcity of misunderstanding these days – let me be clear about this: I am by no means implying that the US-European relationship is even slightly reminiscient of the Russian Cold War imperialism in Eastern Europe.

I should also say that the argument below is based on the assumption that the Iraqi government will be changed forcefully at some point this year, which I am, personally, very sceptical about. My position is probably most accurately reflected by the French one. I’m against war. But if I can’t avoid it anymore, I would at least like to retain some influence over the process, please.

Well, one interpretation of the (generalised) European attitude towards American activities to improve the reliability of Middle Eastern natural energy resource supply as well as US attempts to reshape the political landscape of the region by redistributing the oil profits – ok, the last argument is clearly speculative, but popular large scale redistributions of formerly privatised oil-income would be the obvious starting point for me if I were to convince sceptic Arab polulations of my good intentions as a hegemonic power and the benefits of “democracy” – could be that Europe is taking advantage of American policies in a way reminding me of the former Eastern European trading patterns. It could be that Europe behaves as a rational free rider of American policy.

The world oil market is one big pool and everyone gets the same prices. Given such a pool, it is probably correct to assume that a straightforward American control of the oil-to-market interfaces in the Middle East will also benefit the European economy – in case oil prices as well as oil price volatility come down as a long term result of increased security in the region.

But should the overall impact of a hostile takeover be unfortunate (in all possible respects), Europe will still be able to say, ‘look, Dubya, we told you so.’ Then, however, Europe might be forced out of its free rider position because its clout in the region will have grown substancially. Then it will be expected to act accordingly.

Either way, and moral troubles aside for the moment, things don’t look too bleak for Europe. If the US policy will be succesful in the short run –(definition: get rid of Saddamq quickly and without too many civilian and American victims, not too much bad press, no upward impact on the oil prices that would further shock a world economy already in doldrums, and most importantly, no large scale terrorist attacks in the US (and to a lesser extent, elsewhere in the West.)) – as well as in the long run – (definition: bringing unused Iraqi oil reserves to market thereby reducing the salience of Saudi Arabia as swing producer (easy part), establishing a pro US government as well as a longer term presence in Iraq as a local home base for the “New Great Game” (less easy), redistributing Oil proceeds in a way beneficial to the long term goal of helping the “Islamic reformation”, that is, education, education, education (very difficult), shaking up the Arab peninsula in order to get rid of the weak autocratic regimes without creating too many Mohammed Attas) – it is clearly good for Europe.

In this case, it’s also going to be a bit good cop, bad cop (or Venus and Mars…) – the US might want reduce her visibility as hegemonic power and European nations would step in to manage the nation-building process. European politicians mostly talk about this kind of burden-sharing engagement as “picking up the reconstruction bill“.

But let’s face it – even if that were the case, if the overall outcome of the conflict is not too desastrous, it would probably be a good investment and enhance the European clout in the region. And given that nation-building (including the redistributive policies mentioned above) will in all likelihood be paid out of oil revenues (which the US will not be able to use to pay for the invasion itself) it looks like it’s predominantly the bad cop that will pay the bill this time.

Of course, the free rider argument does not explain the current situation in its entirety. But it does shed some light on the fact that European governments might have had to choose from a slightly different set of policy options if it weren’t for the determined American military presence. Do you really think that Europeans would be able to pose as noble minded people all the time if they had to the dirty work of ensuring energy supply themselves?

Hardly.

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US Politics

Wise Words.

Those of you, my gentle readers, who are frequent visitors will certainly have realised that the issue of the seeming “transatlantic rift” has received considerable attention in this blog. Now I just received an email from a very knowledgeable American friend telling me about his understanding thereof. And he comes up with a very good one-phrase summary of the issue, which I decided to share with you –

“I think the most accurate “truism” about transatlantic relations is that for Americans 9/11 changed the world, but for Europeans 9/11 changed America.”

Of course, the sentence contains a lot to argue with. But none the less, I think it does capture the current transatlantic climate as accurate as it is possible for a single sentence. Wise Words.

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Economics, US Politics

Understanding The Bush Economic Stimulus Package. W’s getting scared.

I don’t know if I am understanding the package correctly. Most of those throwing their opinions in the ring certainly know American politics a lot better than I do.

Their predominant interpretation of the package is that it is not actually intended to stimulate the US economiy but to get Bush reelected in 2004 – that’s why he is handing out even more cash benefits to wealthy Americans not likely to increase their marginal consumption. The Economist tells us that

“[i]t certainly lays Mr Bush open to the familiar charge that he is favouring the better-off. One study has shown that the average annual benefit for people earning less than $10,000 a year would be $6, while that for those with million-dollar-plus incomes would be more than $45,000. Conventional economics suggests that the richer people are, the less propensity they have to spend each additional dollar of income. America might have a long-term need to boost savings rates, but that will not help stimulate the economy.”

Also check these two links [ 1 , 2 ] to Berkeley economics professor Brad DeLong’s blog, if you want.

It is probably right that Bush had his reelection prospects in mind when designing the tax-cut [ ok, he did not do it himself ;-) ]. But I believe, the package’s design also reveals something else: His team is already getting scared. They’re not too sure they’ll be able to supervise the already announced tax-breaks in 2006 to 2010. So he’s delivering to his constituency now as the promised tax-cuts could be repealed later on. Timing is the keyword here. W clearly remembers the fate of his dad back in 1991. He lost the Presidency to Clinton in 1992 because of the post Desert Storm economic slump. As another Iraq war does seem to become increasingly unavoidable from his team’s hawkish perspective, the US administration realises that it could cost W the presidency in 2004 should the possible war’s timing be unfortunate. If things go “well” (again, from a hawkish perspective), it could be over this summer and economic consequences could be bearable. This is the scenario most strategic planners in financial institutions apparently believe to be the most probable.

However, Murphy’s law looms large over all armed operations and things could very well turn out differently. And there are enough military people in W’s administration to remember good old Murphy. That’s why I think this tax break shows the Bush administration is starting to believe their man could lose in 2004. The big question will be – to whom?

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